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Abstract
I ask why humans are smarter than other primates, and I hypothesize that an important part of
the answer lies in the Inner Language Hypothesis, a prerequisite to what I call the Strong Story
Hypothesis, which holds that story telling and understanding have a central role in human intelli-
gence. Next, I introduce the Directed Perception Hypothesis, which holds that we derive much of
our common sense, including the common sense required in story understanding, by deploying our
perceptual apparatus on real and imagined events. Both the Strong Story Hypothesis and the Di-
rected Perception Hypothesis become more valuable in light of our social nature, an idea captured
in the Social Animal Hypothesis. Then, after discussing methodology, I describe the representations
and methods embodied in Genesis, a story-understanding system that analyzes stories ranging from
pre´cis of Shakespeare’s plots to descriptions of conflicts in cyberspace. Genesis works with short
story summaries, provided in English, together with low-level common-sense rules and higher-level
concept patterns, likewise expressed in English. Using only a small collection of common-sense
rules and concept patterns, Genesis demonstrates several story-understanding capabilities, such
as determining that both Macbeth and the 2007 Russia-Estonia Cyberwar involve revenge, even
though neither the word revenge nor any of its synonyms are mentioned.
1. Clues from Caves
Just about everyone agrees that much has been accomplished since Turing (1950) published his
seminal paper, Computer Machinery and Intelligence. On the other hand, most would also agree
that less has been accomplished than expected. Although applications of artificial intelligence are
everywhere, we still do not have a computational theory of human intelligence. A team of dedicated
first-class engineers can build systems that defeat skilled adults at chess and Jeopardy, but no one
can build a system that exhibits the common sense of a child.
What has been tried? Turing argued that human intelligence is a matter of complex symbolic
reasoning. Minsky (2006) argues for a multiplicity of ways of thinking coupled into a reasoning
hierarchy with instinctive reactions on the lowest level and self-conscious reflection on the highest
level. Brooks (1991) argues that, whatever human intelligence is, studying it directly is beyond
the state of the art, and we must instead organize systems in layers of competence, starting with
the objective of understanding low-level layers that produce insect-level intelligence. Still others,
in many seminal papers, have suggested that the right way is, for example, through architectural
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design (Laird et al., 1987), neural mimicry (McClelland & Rumelhart, 1986), or statistical methods
(Pearl, 1988).
Each of these approaches has made important contributions, especially from an engineering
perspective, but none has shown us light at the end of the tunnel, not yet at least.
What is missing, I think, is an approach centered on asking what exactly makes humans differ-
ent from other primates and from early versions of ourselves. For guidance, I ask about the early
history of our species, and I find provocative suggestions in the speculations of paleoanthropolo-
gists, especially those of Tattersall (1998). Basically, Tattersall believes we are symbolic and other
primates were not and are not. He says we were not symbolic either, until about 50,000–70,000
years ago. Before that, we were structurally rather modern for perhaps 100,000 years, but during
that earlier period, like the Neanderthals, all we could do was make simple stone tools and work
with fire.
Then, we started making art, and eventually produced the drilled seashell jewelry found in
the Blombos Cave, the cave paintings at Lascaux, and the figurines at Brassempouy. Such art,
Tattersall believes, requires symbolic thinking and its appearance is evidence of becoming symbolic.
Tattersall argues that we became symbolic rather suddenly, probably in southern Africa, possibly
in a population reduced to a few thousand or a few hundred individuals. It was not a matter of
slowly growing ability proportional to slowly growing brain size. More likely, it was a evolutionary
accident, with nonlinear effects, that unleashed the power of other faculties previously evolved by
selection for benefits other than producing human-level intelligence.
2. Four Hypotheses
Of course, saying we are symbolic does not take us very far toward a computational theory. Chom-
sky (2005), who frequently cites Tattersall, takes us further by suggesting that we are unique in our
ability to combine two concepts to make a third without limit and without disturbing the contribut-
ing two. To a linguist, Chomsky’s suggestion sounds like the merge operation, central to minimalist
theories of language. To many practitioners of artificial intelligence, his suggestion sounds like
the capacity to construct complex descriptions, using some sort of language, which leads to the
following hypothesis:
The Inner Language Hypothesis: Using a symbolic inner language, we construct sym-
bolic descriptions of situations and events that are far beyond the reach of other primates.
I propose to take the inner language hypothesis a step further. I believe that we humans developed
the ability to string event descriptions into stories; that we further developed an ability to move
backward and forward in remembered stories to explain and predict; that our story processing ability
came to include the ability to combine stories into new stories never previously witnessed, from
which imagination emerged. Thinking about this kind of thinking has led me to posit another
hypothesis:
The Strong Story Hypothesis: Our inner language enables us to tell, understand, and re-
combine stories, and those abilities distinguish our intelligence from that of other primates.
24
THE RIGHT WAY
Why are stories so important? Because human education is full of stories, starting in modern times
with the fairy tales of childhood, through the lessons of history, literature, and religious texts, and
on to the cases studied in law, medicine, business, engineering, and science, complemented by the
stories told to us by our parents, siblings, and peers. Even learning to follow a recipe when we learn
a skill can be viewed as a special case of story understanding.
The pioneering natural-language work of Schank and his colleges and students, documented
in numerous articles and books (Schank, 1972; Schank & Abelson, 1977; Schank & Riesbeck,
1981; Schank, 1991), presumed that stories are important. So does more recent work on story
characterization and story generation, such as found in the numerous papers of authors such as
Graesser (2011) and Young (2007). Here, with the Strong Story Hypothesis, I claim that story
understanding is not just important, but rather that story understanding is the centrally important
foundation for all human thinking.
Given that story understanding is centrally important, the next question is: Where does the
common-sense knowledge needed to understand a story come from? We humans do not get it from
the Web or from manually built common-sense databases, and even without a desire to understand
what makes us different from other primates, depending on the Web or other sources of common-
sense data is ill advised, because we know a lot we have never been told nor are likely to be told nor
are likely to find written down anywhere.
I believe we generate much of what we know as needed, via the interaction of our symbolic and
perceptual systems. Sometimes our symbolic system drives our vision system to engage itself on
information in the physical world; at other times our symbolic system drives our visual system to
engage itself on an imagined world.
I believe my point of view is well aligned with the work of Ullman (1996) on visual routines,
which in turn was inspired by many psychophysical studies that suggest our human vision system is
a powerful problem solver, not just an input channel. Accordingly, it is natural to draw a picture and
move a problem from our symbol-processing faculties to our visual faculties whenever the problem
is easier to solve on the visual side.
We often do not have to draw a picture, however, because imagination is enough. Consider this
simple statement–question example: “John kissed Mary. Did John touch Mary?” Everyone seems
to answer the question by deploying visual processes on an imagined kiss. Once that is done, the
action-consequence knowledge can be cached as a rule, but being able to get the common-sense
answer through perception means you can answer the question, when asked, even if you have not
had any sort of kissing education.
Here is a more complex example from personal experience. As a friend helped me install a table
saw, he said, “You should never wear gloves when you use this saw.” At first, I was mystified, then
it occurred to me that a glove could get caught in the blade. No further explanation was needed
because I could imagine what would follow. It did not feel like any sort of formal reasoning. It did
not feel like I would have to have the message reinforced before it sank in. It feels like I witnessed a
grisly event of a sort no one had ever told me. I learned from a one-shot surrogate experience; I told
myself a story about something I had never witnessed, and I will have the common sense to never
wear gloves when I operate a table saw.
Such examples lead me to another hypothesis:
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The Directed Perception Hypothesis: Our inner language enables us to direct the re-
sources of our perceptual systems to answer common-sense questions about real and imag-
ined events, generating common-sense knowledge as a by-product.
Thus, I believe our inner language enables not only story manipulation but also the marshalling of
our perceptual systems, especially our vision system, to solve problems on our behalf and produce
symbolically cached common-sense rules.
So far, I have discussed the value of an inner language, but what about our outer language? The
inner language must have come first, because there is no point in talking if you have nothing to say.
Also, there is no point in talking if there is no one to talk to, so it must be important that we are
social animals. This suggests a fourth claim:
The Social Animal Hypothesis: Our social nature amplifies the value of story understand-
ing and directed perception.
Once we somehow acquired an inner language, developing an outer language added substantial
benefit and perhaps the inner and outer language coevolved rapidly. Being a social animal does
not mean, however, that a sophisticated outer language will emerge, and along with it, an inner
language. Other bipedal primate species have been social animals, but none seems to have become
symbolic, including the Neanderthals.
I believe the four hypotheses are inseparable, and one without the others has only limited po-
tential. With no inner language, there can be no story understanding or directed perception. With
no story understanding or directed perception, having an inner language might enable some sort
of reasoning, but not much educability. Without connection to perception, story understanding re-
duces to disconnected symbol manipulation by a system that may appear to be quite intelligent, but
that depends too exclusively on linguistically supplied knowledge. Without connection to story un-
derstanding, an otherwise capable perception system can initiate reflex action, but lacks the ability
to chain events together, to move backward and forward in such chains, to explain, and to predict.
Without being a social animal, there would be less learning and less pull on inner and outer language
evolution.
3. Five Steps: The Genesis Example
The four hypotheses may not be the whole story, but I believe they are sufficiently important to invite
a great deal of research. Moreover, I believe that such research should proceed by looping through
five steps: identify the competence to be understood; formulate computational problems; propose
computational solutions; develop an exploratory implementation; and crystalize emergent princi-
ples. These steps are reminiscent of the methodological-step recommendations of Marr (1982). The
rest of this section, by way of example, illustrates how the steps have guided my research program
on story understanding.
3.1 First Step: Identify the Competence to be Understood
The competence to be understood is that of analyzing stories, such as the following rendering of the
plot from Shakespeare’s Macbeth:
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Macbeth: Macbeth, Macduff, Lady Macbeth, and Duncan are persons. Macbeth is a thane
and Macduff is a thane. Lady Macbeth, who is Macbeth’s wife, is greedy. Duncan, who
is Macduff’s friend, is the king, and Macbeth is Duncan’s successor. Macbeth defeated
a rebel. Witches had visions and talked with Macbeth. The witches made predictions.
Duncan became happy because Macbeth defeated the rebel. Duncan rewarded Macbeth
because Duncan became happy. Lady Macbeth, who is Macbeth’s wife, wants to become
the queen. Lady Macbeth persuades Macbeth to want to become the king. Macbeth mur-
ders Duncan. Then, Lady Macbeth kills herself. Dunsinane is a castle and Burnham Wood
is a forest. Burnham Wood came to Dunsinane. Macduff had unusual birth. Macduff fights
with Macbeth and kills him. The predictions came true.
I have used simple plot summaries from Shakespeare as anvils on which to hammer out ideas since
my earliest work on analogy (Winston, 1980). My students and I still use them in our latest, much
advanced work because they are easily understood and because they are rich in universally important
factors such as power, emotion, consequence, and ties between people. We have found that the
same kind of common-sense rules and concept patterns that work for Shakespeare also work for
international conflict, such as the alleged 2007 Russian cyberattack on Estonia’s network:
Cyberwar: Estonia and Russia are countries. Computer networks are artifacts. Estonia
insulted Russia because Estonia relocated a war memorial. Someone attacked Estonia’s
computer networks after Estonia insulted Russia. The attack on Estonia’s computer net-
works included the jamming of web sites. The jamming of web sites showed that someone
did not respect Estonia. Estonia created a center to study computer security. Estonia be-
lieved other states would support the center.
Macbeth and Cyberwar are representative in length and sophistication of the two dozen stories on
which we have focused our attention. Of course, two dozen is a small number, but remember that
our ultimate purpose is to understand human understanding, not to engineer systems that only give
the appearance of understanding by processing Web-sized story sets in ways that shed little light, if
any, on human understanding.
What do we mean by understanding? After reading stories such as Macbeth and Cyberwar,
everyone has the competence to answer questions that range from obvious to thought provoking,
many of which do not have explicit answers in the stories themselves: Who ends up dead? Why
did Macduff kill Macbeth? Do the stories involve revenge? Which story presents a Pyrrhic victory?
Is there a Macbeth role in the Russo-Estonia cyberwar? Is Russia’s alleged attack on Estonia’s
computer networks an instance of revenge or teaching a lesson?
3.2 Second Step: Formulate Computational Problems
The competence to be understood draws attention to the key computational question: What rep-
resentations make it possible to understand stories and to exploit that understanding? Certainly,
knowledge will have to be represented, for without a representation, there can be no model, and
without a model, there can be no explanation, prediction, or control.
27
PATRICK HENRY WINSTON
We could just use some sort of semantic net as a universal representation to cover everything,
but we felt it would be instructive to see what kinds of knowledge are needed in story understanding,
how much of each kind is needed, and how often each kind of knowledge is put to use. Also, we were
guided by the principle that refined description tends to expose regularity and constraint. Regularity
and constraint are important, of course, because a model that supports story understanding must
involve common sense and the ability to reflect on the implications of common sense.
Thus, the knowledge-representation question has several aspects, such as: how do we represent
physical, social, and emotional relations and qualities; how do we represent actions and events; how
do we represent common-sense and reflective knowledge?
3.3 Third Step: Propose Computational Solutions
With the competence specified and the representation problem identified, my students and I—the
Genesis Group—anticipated we would need many representations.
We started with explicit representations for categories whose importance is self evident: class,
because what you are determines what you can do (Vaina & Greenblatt, 1979); transition, because
human reasoning seems to focus on how change causes change (Borchardt, 1994), and trajectory,
path, and place, because movement along paths is extraordinarily common in language (Schank,
1972; Jackendoff, 1985). Next, as we discovered representational needs in exploratory implemen-
tation work, we added representations for dealing with coercion (Talmy, 1988), cause, goal, per-
suasion, belief, mood, possession, job, social relations, and time. Then, we added property and
role-frame representations.
Genesis also has a representation for common-sense if–then rules, for much of story understand-
ing seems to be routine inference making, such as knowing that, if one person kills another, then that
other person is dead. Such rules connect explicit events in the story text with inferred events to form
what we decided to call an elaboration graph. Common-sense rule chaining seems necessary but
not sufficient for story analysis, because higher-level reflection seems to require search. Revenge,
for example, is a harm event leading to a second harm event with the actors reversed, possibly with a
long chain of intermediate events. I refer to such descriptions as concept patterns. Genesis deploys
them using breadth-first search in the elaboration graph. This type of analysis is very different in
detail, but inspired by, the pioneering work of Lehnert (1981).
Collectively, all our representations constitute Genesis’s inner language. The representations
in the inner language have come to enable description of just the sorts of concepts that would be
important for survival, particularly classification, movement in the physical world, relationships in
the social world, and various kinds of causation. Thus, Genesis’s inner language is a cognitive
substrate similar in spirit to that proposed by Cassimatis et al. (2008), although different in detail.
Perhaps something like Genesis’s inner language may eventually shed light on the inner language
with which we humans describe the world.
3.4 Fourth Step: Develop an Exploratory Implementation
With the behavior specified, the computational problems identified, and posited solutions in hand,
we set out to develop the exploratory Genesis system.
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As a design principle, we decided that all knowledge provided to Genesis—including stories,
if-then rules, and concept patterns—would be provided in English. We were motivated by our
debugging philosophy and by the permanence of English; we knew that were we to start over, at
least our knowledge base would be reusable.
Given our English-only decision, we had to choose a means to get from English to descriptions
couched in our representation suite. Having tried a popular statistical parser, we eventually choose
to use the Start Parser, developed over a 25-year period by Katz (1997) and his students, because
the Start Parser produces a semantic net, rather than a parse tree, which made it much easier for
us to incorporate it into a system that translates from English into descriptions in Genesis’s inner
language. We also chose to use WordNet (Fellbaum, 1998) as a source of classification information.
We sometimes augment WordNet with information in English as in “A thane is a kind of noble.”
With our Start Parser-enabled translator, we can readily express the needed if–then rules in
English. Examples follow, exactly as provided to Genesis: If X kills Y, then Y becomes dead. If X
harmed Y and Y is Z’s friend, then X harmed Z. X wanted to become king because Y persuaded X
to want to become king. Henry may want to kill James because Henry is angry at James. If James
becomes dead, then James cannot become unhappy.
As the examples show, rules can be expressed as if–then sentences or because sentences, with
or without regular names, and possibly with the modifiers may or cannot. May marks rules that are
used only if an explanation is sought and no other explanation is evident. Cannot marks rules that
act as censors, shutting off inferences that would otherwise be made. In the example, a person does
not become unhappy when he dies, even though killing involves harm and harm otherwise causes
the harmed to become unhappy.
Concept-pattern descriptions are a bit more complicated. Here are two versions of revenge:
• Revenge 1: X and Y are entities. X’s harming Y leads to Y’s harming X.
• Revenge 2: X and Y are entities. X’s harming Y leads to Y’s wanting to harm X. Y’s wanting to
harm X leads to Y’s harming X.
Which is the right version? That, of course, depends on the thinker, so we are able to model specific
thinkers by including more or less sophisticated, or more or less biased, ways of looking at the
world.
Equipped with common-sense rules, Genesis produces elaboration graphs of predictions and
explanations, such as the elaboration graph shown in Figure 1. The white boxes correspond to
elements explicit in the text; the gray boxes correspond to common-sense inferences. Note that,
according to the connections in the graph, Macduff killed Macbeth because Macbeth angered Mac-
duff. Fortunately, we do not always kill the people who anger us, but in the story, as given, there is
no other explanation, so Genesis inserts the connection, believing it to be plausible.
Given the elaboration graph, Genesis is ready to look for higher-level concepts of the sort we
humans would see in the story but only if we reflect on what we read. Genesis sees, for example,
not only Revenge but also a Pyrrhic victory in the elaboration graph for Macbeth shown in Figure 2:
Macbeth wants to be king, murders Duncan to become king, which makes Macbeth happy, but then
the murder leads to Macbeth’s own death.
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Figure 1. Genesis’ story understand ng system pro uces an elaboration graph from common-sense rul s to-
gether with a story. White boxes indicate information given explicitly in the Macbeth story. Gray boxes
indicate information produced by common-sense rules.
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Figure 2. Genesis’s story understanding system uses the elaboration graph, together with concept patterns, to
augment the explicit knowledge provided in the story and simple inferences generated using common-sense
rules. Here, Genesis discovers a Pyrrhic victory, shown highlighted.
For a more contemporary example, Genesis finds revenge in the elaboration graph produced
from a description of the alleged Russian cyberattack on Estonia’s network infrastructure, as shown
in Figure 3. Genesis not only finds revenge, but also looks for the acts of harm involved, then uses
WordNet to find the most related acts in what the political scientists call the Goldstein (1992) index,
which enables it to characterize the revenge in Macbeth as a tit-for-tat, while the revenge in the
Russian cyberattack on Estonia is an escalation.
To take Genesis to a higher level, we have implemented mechanisms that read stories as if by
two separate persona, which we jocularly call Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde. Equipped with overlapping
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Figure 3. The common-sense rules and concept patterns honed on Macbeth have broad application. Here, the
alleged Russian cyberattack on Estonia reveals an instance of revenge, shown highlighted.
but slightly different points of view, the two personas see things differently, in a manner reminiscent
of the early work of Carbonell (1981).
In Figure 4, for example, Dr. Jekyll, on the right, concludes that Macduff kills Macbeth in an
act of insane violence; Mr. Hyde, on the left, sees revenge. Both read the same story, but Dr. Jekyll
thinks the only reason you would kill someone is that you are insane. Mr. Hyde looks for a reason,
and then sees anger. Dr. Jekyll has the rule:
• James may kill Henry because James is not sane.
Mr. Hyde has another rule:
• Henry may kill James because Henry is angry at James.
Social psychologists would say that Dr. Jekyll behaves situationally, more Asian in outlook, because
he looks for a situation that has caused a person to do a terrible thing, whereas Mr. Hyde behaves
dispositionally, more Western in outlook, because he attributes terrible actions to characteristics of
the actor (Morris & Peng, 1994).
An obvious next step will be to demonstrate culturally guided precedent finding, thus contribut-
ing to an important but slowly developing line of research on analogical reasoning (Winston, 1980;
Falkenhainer et al., 1989; Gentner & Markman, 1997; Fay, 2012).
3.5 Fifth Step: Crystalize Emergent Principles
Encouragements, mild surprises, and hints of principles have already emerged from Genesis re-
search. For example, we were encouraged by the ability of Genesis to work with stories of many
types, including not only Shakespeare and conflict in cyberspace, but also simply written fairy tales,
law cases, medical cases, and science fiction. We were surprised that so little knowledge was needed
to produce credible performance. Genesis exhibits some characteristics of human story understand-
ing evidenced by its ability to answer a variety of questions about the stories it reads, yet it does its
work using only about two dozen common-sense rules and another dozen reflective patterns, several
of which, revenge in particular, arose frequently in our experiments.
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Figure 4. Opinions differ according to culture. One person’s act of legitimate revenge is another person’s act
of insane violence.
3.6 The Way Forward
Good hypotheses lead to better questions. Here I list four representative examples that particularly
interest me, all of which emerged from work focused on either the Strong Story Hypothesis or the
Directed Perception Hypothesis.
3.6.1 Story Understanding
While encouraging, our work on Genesis leaves many hard story-understanding problems still to be
addressed. Two that seem especially important are:
How can we build systems that discover their own rules and patterns? At the moment,
Genesis’s education is direct: we provide all the common-sense rules and all the concept patterns
either directly (in lists) or indirectly (embedded in instructional stories). Of course, humans likewise
learn a great deal by being told, but sometimes we form our own common-sense rules and discover
and name our own concept patterns. We want Genesis to do that, too. On the concept-pattern
level, Finlayson (2010) demonstrates how to discover concept patterns automatically in ensembles
of culture-defining stories.
How can we add bulldozer computing to understanding? Systems such as IBM’s Deep Blue
chess player and IBM’s Watson Jeopardy contestant demonstrate what can be done by approaching
a sufficiently narrow problem with serious engineering, massive computing power, and big data.
Our work on Genesis has the opposite polarity. We aim to see how little knowledge Genesis needs
to reach interesting, humanlike conclusions. Eventually, we must somehow learn how to handle
large amounts of knowledge and experience with humanlike finesse. This is the hardest problem
that we face.
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3.6.2 Directed Perception
Vision has received far more attention than story understanding, and with today’s massive com-
puting, big data vision programs produce impressive results. Still, even the best of today’s people
finders occasionally surprise us by misidentifying tree trunks as people, leaving much to be done,
such as addressing the following questions:
How can we develop vision systems that answer common-sense questions? Fortunately, we
seem to be on the leading edge of renewed interest in going beyond object recognition toward visual
reasoning. Several groups, attracted by DARPA support, are developing systems that recognize
actions such as chase, drop, dig, flee, give, jump, push, and throw. Such systems seem poised to
provide play-by-play descriptions of what is happening in front of them, providing a foundation for
answering common-sense questions about what particular people are doing and how.
How can story understanding and vision systems learn to communicate? Of course, we can
program story understanding and vision systems to communicate, but that soon leads to a deeper
question: How do they learn to communicate? In pioneering work, Siskind (1992) showed how
a basic language system can interact with a simulated vision system; Kirby (1998) demonstrated a
system in which a syntax emerges from a set of communicating agents; Coen (2006) demonstrated a
system in which multiple systems learn to work together to understand events viewed from multiple
perceptual perspectives; and Beal (2007) offered a mechanism that acquires knowledge as a by-
product of learning to communicate. All these put hands on a very large elephant (a metaphor that
demonstrates the amazing power of the human visual reasoning system).
4. Contributions
I hypothesized that an inner language is the central element that enables human intelligence. The
inner language is important, in part, because it enables description; description enables story telling;
story telling is central to education; and surrogate experience, in the form of stories, greatly influ-
ences culture. I then hypothesized that the inner language also plays an important role in marshalling
the resources of our vision system, that the inner language stimulates visual imagination, and that
vision is a major problem-solving resource. Finally, I hypothesized that our social nature has a
strong amplifying affect. Thus, the principal contribution of this paper is the articulation of four
hypotheses:
• The Inner Language Hypothesis: Using a symbolic inner language, we construct symbolic
descriptions of situations and events that are far beyond the reach of other primates.
• The Strong Story Hypothesis: Our inner language enables us to tell, understand, and recombine
stories, and those abilities distinguish our intelligence from that of other primates.
• The Directed Perception Hypothesis: Our inner language enables us to direct the resources
of our perceptual systems to answer common-sense questions about real and imagined events,
generating common-sense knowledge as a by-product.
• The Social Animal Hypothesis: Our social nature amplifies the value of story understanding
and directed perception.
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The contributions of those of us who have built the Genesis system include implementing a story
understanding system with both low-level common-sense and higher-level reflective knowledge,
all provided in English; explaining how a story understanding system can find concepts such as
revenge in stories that never mention the word revenge or any of its synonyms; and showing how
to produce cultural variation in story interpretation through modifications of common-sense and
reflective knowledge.
Work on Genesis was motivated by the four hypotheses and conducted in accordance with a
methodology whose steps are identifying the competence to be understood; formulating compu-
tational problems; proposing computational solutions; developing an exploratory implementation;
and crystallizing emergent principles. Accordingly, we believe we have offered an example of the
right way to work toward an account of human intelligence.
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